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From June 10 to June 12, 1871, American amphibious forces engaged in a 
forty-eight hour battle with the Chosŏn dynasty of  Korea.  Though trivialized 
in the New York Herald under the headline of  “Our Little War With the 
Heathens,”1 the affair inflicted more casualties on Asian peoples than any 
other American military action until the Philippine uprising of  1899.   A fleet 
boasting five Americans warships set sail for Korea on May 16th with eighty 
pieces of  cannon and 1,230 men aboard, under the command of  Rear Admiral 
John Rodgers.  The expedition pursued a diplomatic mission—the opening of  
Korea to international commercial trade—entrusted to United States Minister 
to China Frederick Low.  However, the expedition secured authorization from 
the State Department to impose their aims by force if  necessary.  On May 
31, the Americans reached Ganghwa Island in the estuary of  the Han River. 
Korean soldiers stationed at fortresses lining the river bend at Sondolmok fired 
upon the westerners.  Homer Crane Blake, Captain and Commander of  the 
USS Alaska, describes the outbreak of  hostilities in a letter written on June 2.
As we came up abreast, a single shot, apparently from 
a musket or pistol, was fired from near the standard, and 
instantly, from the fort and masked batteries along the face 
of  the hill, they opened a heavy fire upon the ships and 
boats, which was promptly returned from all the vessels, and 
which soon drove them from the guns, they retreating to the 
ravines.2
The Americans drew back, demanding an apology from the prefect of  
Ganghwa Island.  With none forthcoming, the Americans launched a counter-
offensive upon the expiration of  a ten-day ultimatum.  The Americans’ 
superior firepower generated a large discrepancy in casualties.  The United 
States razed three Korean fortresses—Ch’oji, Kwangsong and Tokjin—
killing 350 Koreans while suffering only three fatalities of  their own.  On 
June 12th, the Americans departed from Korea, citing the lopsided death 
toll as evidence of  an overwhelming victory.  On July 17th, the New York 
Times celebrated the “Speedy and Effective Punishment of  the Barbarians.”3 
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However, the Korean Government celebrated the American withdrawal as 
a great victory and a vindication of  their time-honored policy of  seclusion. 
At face value, the events related above can be interpreted in numerous 
ways.  For example, Neoconservatives and Liberal internationalists might 
herald the initiative as a laudable effort to bring the benefits of  international 
exchange to a people subjugated by a backward regime.  On the other hand, 
revisionists and anti-interventionists might view America’s acts as a shameful 
example of  cruel, imperialistic and self-interested gunboat diplomacy. 
However, when placed in the proper context of  American diplomacy in the 
Far East, the American Invasion of  Korea proves virtually indistinguishable 
in terms of  ideology from such widely heralded American triumphs as the 
1844 Treaty of  Wanghia and Commodore Perry’s expedition to Japan in 
1853.  To demonstrate this fact, this paper endeavors to construct a complete 
narrative of  the American Invasion, furnishing the above events with their 
proper setting, story line, and resolution.  In doing so, the true nature of  
the invasion comes to light: an attempt to carry on established American 
traditions sabotaged by woeful tactics and flawed geopolitical assessments.
This study’s survey of  19th century American Diplomacy relies on Tyler 
Dennett’s seminal work, Americans in Eastern Asia: A Critical Study of  the United 
States with reference to China, Japan and Korea in the 19th Century.  Much of  the 
analytical framework of  this paper comes from the work of  Lawrence H. 
Battistini, Walter LaFeber, and the essays compiled in Ernest R. May and 
James C. Thomson’s anthology, American-East Asian Relations: A Survey.  The 
more detailed chronology of  American diplomacy regarding the Korean crisis 
draws upon American diplomatic documents and correspondence compiled 
in the official documentary historical record, Foreign Relations of  the United States. 
The following works also aided the construction of  this historical chronology: 
Kim Yongkoo’s The Five Years’ Crisis, 1866-1871, Gordon H. Chang’s 
Whose “Barbarism”? Whose “Treachery”? Race and Civilization in the Unknown 
United States-Korea War of  1871, and Woong Joe Kang’s The Korean Struggle 
for International Identity in the Foreground of  the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866-1882.
American Diplomacy in the Far East
In the nation’s infancy, a number of  worrying prospects confronted 
American statesmen.  First, if  America became enmeshed in Europe’s wars 
of  imperialism, the requisite military mobilization would infringe on the 
domestic liberty for which colonial patriots had so vehemently struggled, as 
these conflicts could transpire on American soil.  Second, forging alliances 
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The Empress of China at Mart’s Jetty, Port Pirie, 1876. The first American ship to 
open trade with China, the Empress of China set sail from New York for Canton 
in 1784. 
46  Ian Murray
Seward’s True Folly
with the more potent nations of  Europe would require American statesmen 
to adopt alien causes.  Furthermore, an America open to foreign alliance 
would be subject to European courtship, begetting factionalism within the 
Union.  George Washington, with significant editorial input from Alexander 
Hamilton, addressed each of  these concerns in his 1796 Farewell Address, 
proclaiming that “nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate 
antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others 
should be excluded, and that in place of  them just and amicable feelings toward 
all should be cultivated.”4  In this way, George Washington enshrined the 
American ideal of  maintaining unilateral commercial relations with all states, 
“regardless of  their form of  government or the extent of  their imperialism.”5
In 1784, America began the process of  forging such unilateral commercial 
relationships in the Far East.  On August 28, the Empress of  China, a refitted 
privateer from the Revolutionary War docked in Canton, marking the start 
of  a tradition that would come to be known as the “Old China Trade.”  A 
close-knit group of  New England merchants dominated this trade, motivated 
more by their enterprising spirit than by any demand for Chinese goods in 
America.  Due to the remoteness of  the Far East and the small percentage 
of  the American population concerned with its affairs, the State Department 
rarely meddled in Sino-American relations at this early stage.  As a result, 
historians such as Tyler Dennett assert that American activity in Asia prior 
to 1840 was void of  political significance.  Edward D. Graham, however, 
considers such a judgment “arguable.”6  In reality, the Government’s hands-
off  approach to Far Eastern affairs during the early 19th century contributed 
greatly to the development of  a diplomatic policy in the Pacific centered 
on commercial interests.  As Washington initially left early merchants to 
their own devices, they inevitably followed their capitalistic self-interest 
when making on-the-spot decisions.  By the sum of  these decisions, New 
England merchants forged a tradition of  seeking equal trade agreements 
and extraterritoriality.  This model, Dennett agrees, became the modus 
operandi adopted by the State Department in the second half  of  the century.
America’s relationship with the Far East evolved towards the middle of  the 
19th century largely as a function of  both technological and political phenomena. 
The development of  the clipper ship and the steamship greatly enhanced the 
efficiency of  maritime trade.  The acquisition of  California in 1848 gave the 
United States a Pacific port.  Finally, the decision of  Great Britain that same 
year to nullify the last vestiges of  the Navigation Acts granted Americans 
equal commercial rights within the British Isles.  These conditions produced a 
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golden age of  American maritime activity, with the high point coming in 1855 
when American shipping totaled 5,212,000 tons.7  American Exports to China, 
which had totaled only about $2 million in the 1840s, rose to nearly $9 million in 
the 1860s.8  The increasing significance of  Pacific trade spurred the American 
Government into action on the Far Eastern front.  The Government’s policy, 
as presaged by the activities of  the New England merchants during the “Old 
China Trade,” focused on earning most-favored-nation privileges from East 
Asian governments.  The State Department also favored the preservation 
and territorial integrity of  sovereign nations such as China and Japan, partly 
from an ideological distaste for colonialism, but mostly to prevent European 
spheres of  influence from interfering with American economic opportunities.
The realities of  East Asian diplomacy, however, obligated Americans to 
compromise these principles in day-to-day operations.  According to John 
K. Fairbank, “The idea of  the American diplomatic approach to China as 
independent of  the British, less imperialistic, more friendly and egalitarian and 
yet enterprising and decisive…does not fit with the British diplomatic records.”9 
Americans constituted only one small element of  large foreign community in 
China.  In 1836, only nine of  the fifty-five foreign firms operating in Canton 
were American.10  The foreign community as a whole was in turn subsidiary to 
the Chinese ruling class.  Britons adapted much more easily to the social ideals 
of  the ruling class, often causing Americans to embrace Anglo-American 
collaboration under British leadership.  All in all, Fairbank concludes, “the 
American in China was obliged to be a democrat manqué, a ruler with qualms 
of  conscience, in a world he never made but found seductively enjoyable.”11
Though commonly frustrated by routine activities, the State 
Department was nevertheless able to institute American tradition through 
the negotiation of  grand commercial treaties with major Far Eastern 
nations.  In 1832, Andrew Jackson sent Edmund Roberts on a voyage to 
negotiate commercial agreements with Siam, Hué, and Japan.  He achieved 
his aim in the first country, failed in the second, and perished en route to 
the third.  In 1839, Martin Van Buren authorized Captain Charles Wilkes 
to explore the Pacific.  According to Thomas McCormick, the mission 
helped the United States become “the most knowledgeable power in the 
world as far as the great Pacific basin was concerned.”12  On December 
1842, President John Tyler extended the Monroe Doctrine to the 
Hawaiian Islands, publicly denouncing any attempt at their colonization.
British victory in the First Opium War inspired the first truly significant 
American diplomatic action in East Asia.  Through the 1842 Treaty of  
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Nanking, Britain captured Hong Kong and four other Chinese ports, as well 
as authority over Chinese tariffs and customs rates.  New England merchants, 
injured by an economic depression from which America was just beginning to 
recover, recognized the need to ensure the continued commercial privileges 
in China.  They put pressure on Secretary of  State Daniel Webster, who in 
turn employed Caleb Cushing as the first U.S. minister to China.  In a letter 
drafted on May 8, 1843, Webster charged Cushing to negotiate a commercial 
treaty with Middle Kingdom, securing “the entry of  American ships and 
cargoes into these ports on terms as favorable as those which are enjoyed by 
English merchants.”13 This letter formally inaugurated the American tradition 
of  insisting upon most-favored-nation treatment.  Americans celebrated 
their new “special relationship,” being the first anti-imperialist power to 
forge an agreement with China. The Treaty of  Wanghia, signed in 1844, 
fulfilled all of  Webster’s objectives, including the guarantee of  extraterritorial 
rights for American merchants in China.  By this time, however, Webster 
was no longer at the reins of  the State Department.  Both he and his 
successor Abel P. Upshur had since relinquished the post of  Secretary 
of  State, leaving the position to former Vice President John C. Calhoun
After seven years out of  the State Department, five of  which he spent in the 
Senate, Webster returned to his old position in the Cabinet of  Millard Fillmore. 
Again, Webster took action in the Far East, this time turning his attention to 
the staunchly isolationist regime in Japan.  Americans salivated at the promise 
of  lucrative Japanese trade, which was forbidden by ancient Japanese laws that 
Americans found loathsome and unnatural.  Webster hoped to end Japan’s 
deviant resistance to foreign trade—on American terms of  course.  This 
meant most-favored-nation status.  He also he wished to protect shipwrecked 
Americans, who had often received brutal welcomes upon washing up on 
Japanese shores.  Finally, he planned to establish coaling stations in Japan 
to facilitate more efficient passage of  steamships from California to China. 
To this end, Webster (who died before the mission was launched) sent 
Commodore Perry to Japan in 1853 with a sizeable fleet of  steamships. 
Perry carried with him a letter from Millard Fillmore, proposing to 
the Emperor of  Japan “that the United States and Japan should live in 
friendship and have commercial intercourse with each other.”14  As Webster’s 
directions to Cushing had a decade earlier, Fillmore’s letter stressed the 
mutual benefits of  the arrangement, imploring, “If  your imperial majesty 
were so far to change the ancient laws as to allow a free trade between the 
two countries it would be extremely beneficial to both.”1516*  Perry sought 
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to demonstrate the technological prowess of  America, both through 
his fleet and through gifts such as a miniature railroad and Japan’s first 
telegraph.  Japanese cooperation was hesitant but ultimately forthcoming; 
Townshend Harris eventually secured the opening of  five major ports 
and affirmed American extraterritoriality rights in Japan in 1858.  For the 
time being, however, there was no talk of  a “special relationship.”  In a 
spirit they would later apply to Korea, Americans believed that they were 
“civilizing” Japan.  In the words of  Willie P. Mangum, a Whig Senator 
from North Carolina, “You have to deal with barbarians as barbarians.”17
Few Americans have had as decided an impact on their nation’s relations 
with East Asia as William H. Seward, who took control of  the State 
Department in the 1860s.  He assumed the role of  Secretary of  State under 
President Abraham Lincoln March 5, 1861.  He would retain this position 
under Lincoln’s successor, Andrew Johnson, the last chapter of  a prominent 
political life.  Born in Orange Country, New York on May 16, 1801, he served 
as both Governor and Senator for his home state for a combined 22 years. 
He was even considered the frontrunner for the Republican nomination for 
President in 1860, prior to being eclipsed by Lincoln.  Seward vigorously 
advocated the pursuit of  American interests in Asia, considering the Pacific 
Ocean the “chief  theatre of  events in the world’s great hereafter.”18  While 
still a member of  the Senate, he demonstrated this attitude by putting aside 
his deep-seated opinion against slavery to support Californian statehood.  He 
did not envision American activity in the Pacific sphere as military or imperial, 
but rather as a mutually beneficial exchange of  goods and ideas.  He assumed 
that this genre of  American intervention would be greeted by Far Eastern 
nations as a desirable alternative to violent European conquest, asking, “If  
they could be roused and invigorated now, would they spare their European 
oppressors and spite their American benefactors?”19  His most visible 
contribution to the American cause in the Pacific was the purchase of  Alaska 
from Russia, concluded in 1867, which acquired the moniker “Seward’s Folly.”
Seward insisted on the protection of  Americans and their property in China, 
but remained cautious to avoid disrespecting Chinese rights.  On August 14, 
1865, he affirmed that, “the Government of  the United States is not disposed 
to be technical or exacting in its intercourse with the Chinese Government, 
but will deal with it in entire frankness, cordiality, and friendship.”20   With 
regard to Japan, however, Seward proved more callous and skeptical.  Seward 
seemed to operate on the assumption that Japan was incessantly plotting to 
shirk its treaty obligations.  He believed that American commercial rights in 
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Japan were vulnerable, and that the expulsion of  foreigners was imminent. 
Seward’s mistrust of  the Japanese generated an unstable state of  affairs when 
coupled with his willingness to employ the use of  force.  According to Tyler 
Dennett, “Seward, more than any Secretary of  State before or since his day, 
was favorably disposed toward a “gun-boat diplomacy.”21  For instance, on 
the night of  December 5, 1860, Henry Heusken, a Dutch translator in the 
service of  United States Consul-General to Japan Townshend Harris, was 
assassinated by a handful of  masked assailants.  In response, Seward, who 
took office the following March, proposed a joint naval demonstration against 
Japan to the foreign offices of  France, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia. 
Officially, Korea in the 1860s was a part of  the Sadae order, a sinocentric 
and Confucian international system that governed certain areas of  East 
Asia.  The order prescribed a hierarchical, anti-egalitarian society based 
on the ideology of  li—individual morality and harmony between the ruler 
and the ruled.  This principle applied to international relations within the 
order.  Therefore, Imperial China’s Zongli Yamen, the government entity 
charged with foreign affairs, handled the official diplomatic activity of  its 
obedient vassal states such as Korea.  However, according to Tyler Dennett, 
China’s chokehold on Korea was not so severe.  In fact, China repeatedly 
insisted in diplomatic communication with foreign nations that Korea was 
administratively independent.  They even refused to accept any responsibility 
for Korean destruction or injury of  foreign life and property.  China 
essentially pursued a “dog-in-the-manger policy.”  They did not want Korea, 
but they did not want Korea to come under the shadow of  any other power, 
nor did they relish the idea of  Korean independence.”22  In 1863, the teenage 
King Gojong assumed Korea’s throne.  Power rested in the hands of  his 
father and regent Daewongun until the King reached adulthood in 1873. 
Daewongun staunchly advocated isolationism, as well as the persecution of  
Western missionaries.  Koreans considered all Westerners “barbarians,” as 
did most East Asian peoples.  This category, of  course, included Americans
On the eve of  engagement with Korea, American diplomacy, imbued with 
the goals of  securing most-favored-nation status and extraterritorial rights in 
East Asia, sat in the hands of  Secretary of  State William H. Seward, who deeply 
mistrusted isolationist regimes and held no reservations about employing 
force to ensure their compliance with international free trade. Korea, with 
Daewongun as the head of  state, also had a resolute diplomatic policy: 
staunch isolationism.  On top of  all this, despite having developed a friendly 
commercial relationship with China, America could not rely on the mediating 
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influence of  the Middle Kingdom.  China in the 1860s wished neither to manage 
the administration of  Korea nor take any responsibility for Korea’s quarrels. 
The French Invasion of  Korea
America was not the first western nation to attempt to engage Korea 
diplomatically in the late 19th century.  Indeed, France cast the initial stone 
to rouse Korea from its hibernation on the international stage.  Like other 
contemporaneous European states, 19th century France exploited legal 
positivism to codify a diplomacy based on Eurocentricism.  Europeans 
classified international actors into three categories: civilized states, who were 
to be treated as full subjects of  the law; semi-civilized states, who were to be 
exploited via asymmetrical treaties; and barbarians, who were to be exploited 
by invasion and occupation.  Korea belonged firmly in the third category. 
The European mechanism for establishing relations with this category 
of  nations was predatory imperialism, a model in which private enterprise 
(legitimate or otherwise) and missionary expeditions paved the way for state 
participation.  Accordingly, the earliest French presence in Korea arrived 
in the form of  Catholic missionaries.  At first, these missionaries profited 
from existing Confucian rites to ease the natives’ transition from traditional 
“barbarism” to enlightened Catholicism.  However, the Vatican suppressed 
this opportunistic behavior in 1742, when Pope Benedict XIV issued an 
edict outlawing both the veneration of  Confucius and the worship of  one’s 
ancestors.  This measure strained relations between Korea and the French 
missionaries therein, notably inspiring the state-sanctioned execution of  300 
Catholics in 1801.  Tensions flared once more in 1866, when the Korean 
government deemed Catholicism irreconcilable with the Confucian political 
order (the former declaring all men equal before God), and authorized the 
repression of  Catholic activity on the peninsula.  For France, the most salient 
consequence of  this declaration was the execution of  nine French priests
The French response was retaliation.  In a letter home to his parents sent 
from Ning-Po, China, French quartermaster Eugène Masson defended his 
nation’s reprisal with the following simple explanation: “It was necessary to 
find these Korean gentlemen to teach them that they don’t have the right to 
treat our compatriots in such a manner.”23  However, pure vengeance was 
not the sole motive for French action.  At least one implicated Frenchman, 
Minister to China Henri de Bellonet, perceived the Korean calamity as a 
grand opportunity.  He revealed his ulterior geopolitical motives in a letter to 
E.D. Lhuys, the French Minister of  Foreign Affairs:
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Rear Admiral John Rodgers confers with other officers on board the USS 
Colorado during the American expedition, June 1871 
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I am not going to make a long explanation about the 
advantages of  making Chosun a colony or simply put in the 
position of  being under the protection of  our Emperor.  It 
is enough just to glance at the map to see that it is useful 
to send troops to this country, in case of  the complications  
which  might  arise  between  China and  Japan in the 
future.”24
Without requesting the proper authorization, Bellonet sent a 
highly inflammatory dispatch to the Zongli Yamen on July 13, 
1866.  Its contents amount to a declaration of  war against Korea on 
behalf  of  the Emperor, egregiously over-reaching his jurisdiction.
 In a few days our military forces are to march to the conquest 
of  Chosun, and the Emperor, my august sovereign, alone, 
has now the right and power to dispose, according to his 
good pleasure, of  the country and of  the vacant throne.25
 Bellonet’s actions enraged Rear Admiral Pierre Gustave Roze, 
Commander of  the French Far East Squadron.  Roze expressed his fury to 
Justin, comte de Chasseloup-Laubat, the Minister of  the Navy, complaining 
that China would certainly forward Bellonet’s bluster to the Koreans, giving 
them ample time to prepare their defenses.  Indeed, China did warn Korea of  
the planned French aggression on August 16.  Furthermore, Roze protested 
that Bellonet had stepped on his toes.  Since France had not established 
diplomatic relations with Korea, the military should have primary jurisdiction 
in Korean affairs.  Chasseloup-Laubat feared conflict, insecure about France’s 
incomplete knowledge of  Korean coastal geography.  Roze, however, had 
already sailed his fleet, carrying about 1,000 men, into Korean waters. 
In his aforementioned letter to his parents, quartermaster Eugène Masson 
again displays his penchant for poetic simplicity when discussing the nature 
of  the Roze expedition.  He sums up the experience in the following manner: 
“During our journey, we passed ourselves off  as children of  the moon, but a 
short distance from the capital the Koreans probably found that the children 
of  the moon penetrated too far into their interior.”26  The French occupied 
Kapgot fortress on Kanghwa Island on October 14, proceeding to occupy 
the office of  the Island’s magistrate on the 16th.  On October 26, three French 
soldiers perished in a skirmish at Munsu Mountain fortress.  November 10 
saw the most dramatic action of  the expedition.  Yang Honsu led a corps 
of  professional hunters in an ambush of  the French garrison at Chondung 
Temple, slaying thirty-two French soldiers while suffering only one casualty. 
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In his study of  the Five Years’ Crisis, Kim Yongkoo notes that this battle 
represented “One of  the few instances in the colonialist history of  Europe 
in which European soldiers were defeated in non-European territory.”27 
The victory sufficed to encourage a withdrawal of  the French presence. 
Roze intended the retreat to be temporary, as suggested by Masson’s letter:
We left Korea to spend the winter in China because we did 
not have a large enough force to occupy the entire power, it 
is probable that if  the King is not overthrown by next spring, 
we shall return with superior force sent to us from France.28
 The French never returned to Korea.  The failure of  Roze’s expedition 
greatly embarrassed France in the eyes of  international public opinion.  The 
French government directed its anger at Roze and Bellonet, both having 
engaged in decisive action in the absence of  any clear instructions from 
Paris.  On November 11, 1866, French Minister of  Foreign Affairs Lionel, 
Marquis de Moustier reproached Bellonet, writing, “I am very seriously 
shocked by your belief  that you could carry out any actions which suited 
your own personal agenda though no such authority had been granted you.”29
Two outcomes of  the French failure in Korea would have a significant 
impact on American diplomacy in the Far East.  First, Korean morale 
soared in the wake of  the departed would-be colonists.  Stone tablets were 
erected, furnished with the inscription, “Not to fight back when invaded 
by Western barbarians is to invite further attacks.  Selling the country out 
in peace negotiations is the greatest danger to guard against.”30  A dispatch 
was sent to high-ranking officials in the Government that would seem to 
pose an ominous threat to America’s ultimate designs in Korea: “If  we 
are unable to endure our strife and have to make a treaty with foreigners, 
it would be an act of  betrayal to our country.”31  Second, Admiral Roze 
brought back from Korea intelligence that the Koreans had burned an 
American vessel, the General Sherman, apparently slaughtering its entire crew.
The General Sherman and Korean-American Tension
As was the case for the French, individual action preceded calculated 
American intervention, in this case piracy.  On September 5, 1866, the U.S. 
merchant ship General Sherman was set ablaze by Korean artillery under the 
orders of  Pak Kyusu, Governor of  P’yongan Province.  It is vital to note that 
the American government did not ascertain the full details of  the incident for 
approximately two decades, although the correct chronology is maintained 
below.  The General Sherman was owned by an American, W.B. Preston, but had 
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been hired by a British firm, Messrs. Meadows and Company, to transport 
commercial freight and arms.  The ship set sail from Chefoo, China en route 
to Korea for the purported purpose of  conducting trade.  In reality, the 
motives behind the expedition were far more dastardly, involving the looting 
of  royal tombs in the vicinity of  P’yongyang.  The General Sherman’s Captain 
Page was American, while the Manager of  commodities, George Hogarth, 
and the translator, Robert Jermain Thomas, were both British.  On August 
27th, the expedition kidnapped Pak’s Military Aide, Yi Hyonik.  Four days later, 
cannon fire from the General Sherman felled 12 Korean soldiers and civilians. 
The sum of  these offensive actions roused Pak to retaliation, bringing a fiery 
end to what the United States assumed to be a legitimate trading mission. 
Upon returning to China from Korea in October of  1866, Admiral Roze 
relayed his limited intelligence of  the destruction of  the General Sherman 
incident to E.T. Sanford, the American consul in Chefoo.  Sanford dutifully 
notified Anson Burlingame, the American Minister to China.  Burlingame 
passed along the information to three recipients.  The first was Prince Kung 
of  China, who insisted that the relationship between China and Korea was 
purely ceremonial, disavowing Chinese responsibility for Korean diplomatic 
conduct.  The second was Admiral Henry H. Bell, Commander of  the 
Asiatic Squadron of  the United States’ Navy.  The third was Secretary of  
State William H. Seward, to whom Burlingame wrote on December 15, 1866.
The Navy responded first, by virtue of  the fact that Burlingame’s letter 
did not have to travel as far to reach Bell as it did to reach Seward.  Admiral 
Bell sent Robert W. Shufeldt with the USS Wachusetts to investigate the fate 
of  the General Sherman.  Shufeldt carried with him a letter to the King, and 
met with an official from the city of  Haeju on January 29, 1867.  The official 
behaved arrogantly, but insisted that he had no information concerning 
the incident, even after Shufeldt threatened violent retaliation.  Shufeldt 
departed from Korea without gaining any useful information, though he 
did develop a suspicion that the crew of  the General Sherman may have been 
responsible for its own demise.  During his journey, Shufeldt took the liberty 
of  examining Port Hamilton, a small group of  islands off  the southern 
coast of  Korea.  He supposed that these islands could be strategically useful, 
comparing them to Gibraltar.  He suggested that the United States could 
seize the islands and “operate upon the Southern coast of  Corea until that 
government is forced to acknowledge at least its responsibility to foreigners.”32
Needless to say, the mysterious destruction of  an American merchant 
ship deeply troubled the State Department.  Upon receiving Burlingame’s 
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dispatch, William Seward immediately drew up plans for a proposed 
joint invasion of  the peninsula in cooperation with France, who he 
assumed would be itching for retribution after the defeat of  Admiral 
Roze.  Secretary of  the Navy Gideon Welles, however, espoused 
cautious prudence, urging the State Department to launch a thorough 
investigation of  the incident rather than engage in rash retaliation. 
Burlingame likewise sought to temper the Secretary of  State’s aggression 
when he initially notified Seward of  the General Sherman incident, writing:
If  my advice can have weight, it will be that our presence 
there should rather restrain than promote aggression, and 
serve to limit the action to such satisfaction only as great 
and civilized nations should, under the circumstances, have 
from the ignorant and weak.33
Nevertheless, Seward plowed forward, proposing his strategy to J.F.G. 
Berthémy, the French Minister to the United States, on March 2, 1867. 
Berthémy favored the proposal, citing its potential to repair Franco-American 
relations, cancel out the failure of  the previous year’s expedition, open Korea 
to foreign trade and investment, and stymie Russian expansionist designs in the 
Far East.  Such an alliance would have wedded the efforts of  two nations with 
radically different priorities in the region.  According to Boleslaw Szczesniak,
For France the expedition to Korea was a kind of  
imperialistic punishment for the loss of  French property 
and life—especially since France even considered the 
annexation of  Korea—while for America it was a method 
of  cooperative participation in opening the “hermit nation” 
for peaceful reasons.”34  
Berthémy’s government, however, declined the proposal, for reasons which 
cannot be comprehended without some knowledge of  contemporaneous 
French geopolitics.
In January of  1862, France, along with Spain and Britain, had sent a fleet 
to Mexico in an effort to compel President Benito Juarez to resume interest 
payment on national debts.  The Spanish and British soon realized that 
Napoleon III’s true aim was to conquer Mexico, and chose to withdraw their 
forces in April.  France suffered an initial setback at the Battle of  Puebla 
on May 5, but rallied with a string of  victories culminating in the capture 
of  Mexico City on June 7, 1863.  On April 10, 1864, Archduke Maximilian 
Ferdinand of  the Royal House of  Austria signed the Treaty of  Miramar, 
accepting his appointment to the Mexican throne.  This deed incurred the 
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wrath of  the United States, whose Congress unanimously passed a resolution 
opposing a Mexican monarchy.  The following spring, the tide began to turn 
against the French.  On April 11, the army of  the Mexican Republic won 
battles at Tacambaro and Michoacan.  As the American Civil War drew to a 
close, the United States sent 50,000 troops to the Mexican border to threaten 
the French and furnish the Republican army with supplies.  In February of  
1866, the United States blockaded French shipments of  reinforcements and 
demanded a French withdrawal, to which Napoleon III complied on May 31. 
On June 19, 1867, the Republican forces executed Maximilian I and restored 
Benito Juarez to the Mexican presidency. 
In the throes of  the Mexican calamity, France’s Second Empire could 
not afford to suffer any additional humiliations in the international theater. 
Accordingly, when Admiral Roze withdrew from Korea in November of  1866, 
the French government profited from the remoteness of  the conflict to simply 
claim victory.  After initially admonishing Roze and Bellonet in diplomatic 
correspondence, the French Government ultimately rewarded each man’s 
initiative with promotion.  Bellonet bade adieu to the Pacific and settled into a 
more comfortable position as Minister to Sweden.  Roze inherited the role of  
Acting Viceroy of  Indochina, later ascending to a highly influential position 
as Commander of  the Mediterranean Fleet.  This stunning act of  revisionism 
on the part of  the French spared the Emperor the bother of  further activity 
in Korea.  Claiming that French objectives had been thoroughly satisfied, the 
French declined to take part in Seward’s joint invasion. 
The French refusal ushered in a year of  cautious inaction.  The stalemate 
was broken in March 1868 when Yu Wentai, a Chinese national who had 
abandoned the voyage of  the General Sherman, informed a U.S. consul in 
China that four crewmembers of  the General Sherman remained alive in 
Korea.  Furthermore, Yu believed that two of  the survivors were Chinese 
nationals.  Yu claimed to have received this information from a Korean 
named Kim Chap’yong.  Samuel Wells Williams, acting as Minister to China 
while Burlingame turned his attention to the negotiations of  the Burlingame 
Treaty, sent a letter to Prince Kung on March 3, imploring China to assist 
America’s investigations.  On March 9, the Prince upheld China’s laissez faire 
policy toward Korean affairs, replying: “Although Chosun is in one sense a 
dependency of  China, her authorities are now engaged in eradicating western 
religion and forbidding its exercise, and their proceedings in this matter are 
carried on by themselves just as they please.”35  China did, however, issue a 
request that Korea return any surviving crewmembers.
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Forced to act without Chinese assistance, the Navy dispatched Captain 
John C. Febiger and the USS Shenandoah to Korea, in search of  information 
and survivors.  Febiger first met with Kim Chap’yong, who denied having 
provided Yu Wentai with any information.  Febiger’s mission, however, was 
far more successful than Shufeldt’s.  Korea received the captain far more 
warmly, and on April 30 the Korean Council of  the State ruled that Febiger 
was entitled to a letter of  explanation from Pak Kyusu, governor of  Hwanghae 
province.  Pak himself  was largely responsible for the change in Korea’s 
attitude.  A respected and forward-thinking scholar, he educated many of  the 
intellectuals who would later found the reform-minded Enlightenment Party. 
Pak supported engaging American in negotiations as early as 1866.  According 
to Kim Yongkoo, he “transcended Korean experience and glimpsed the true 
nature of  Western society before Korea became actively involved in it.”36 
He believed that the Korean Government had dealt inappropriately with 
Shufeldt, and encouraged Koreans to welcome Captain Febiger.  In his letter, 
Pak praises the moral standards of  the United States, but also accurately 
depicts the violent nature of  the General Sherman excursion and justifies the 
Korean response.  He expresses the bewilderment of  Koreans at American 
indignation, explaining that the crew of  the General Sherman “came into our 
country without permission and caused complications, and now you are 
blaming us for that incident and we do not understand your intention in doing 
so.”37  When the letter was forwarded to Shufeldt, he praised its construction 
and trusted its contents, reporting, “The letter was so statesman-like in its 
character and bore such intrinsic evidence of  the truth of  its statements that 
both Captain Febiger and I were convinced that the attack on the General 
Sherman was made by an unauthorized mob under strong provocation.”38
Around this time, the State Department again leapt into action, receiving 
intelligence from Frederick Jenkins, an interpreter with the U.S. Consul-General 
in Shanghai, suggesting that Korea may be willing to negotiate a peaceful 
resolution of  the predicament.  Seward acted swiftly to seize this opportunity, 
endowing his nephew George, the U.S. Consul-General in Shanghai, with 
plenipotentiary powers and sending him to Korea “to procure a treaty of  amity 
and commerce as nearly similar in its provisions to those existing between the 
United States and Japan as may be found practicable and expedient.”39  In his 
official instructions, Seward stressed the peaceful nature of  the expedition, 
reminding his nephew “to practise discretion, prudence, and patience, while 
firmly asserting the dignity and maintaining the demands of  the United 
States”40 and urging him to reserve force “for ultimate consideration.”41 
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Unfortunately, with the expedition barely underway, it became obvious 
that Jenkins had swindled the State Department. He was in fact mixed 
up in an illicit conspiracy, hatched by corrupt French missionary Father 
Stanislas Féron and German businessman Ernst Oppert.  Féron, who had 
been rescued from Korea by the French invasion, hoped to return to the 
peninsula to unearth the remains of  the biological father of  Daewongun. 
He enlisted the financial support of  Frederick Jenkins, who duped the State 
Department into orchestrating a mission to Korea, an elaborate cover for 
Féron’s scheme.  On July 3, 1868, George Seward sent a dispatch to his 
uncle, informing him “that the party with which Mr. Jenkins proceeded 
to Corea had been engaged in an attempt to take from their tombs the 
remains of  one or more sovereigns of  that country for the purpose, it 
would seem, of  holding them for ransom.”42  On July 27, 1868, William 
H. Seward withdrew his instructions.  His first two attempts to resolve the 
General Sherman crisis yielded no progress.  Four days later, Wells Williams 
communicated the results of  Febiger’s voyage to the Secretary of  State, 
informing him that the whole crew of  the General Sherman had undoubtedly 
perished, and that “the evidence goes to uphold the presumption that they 
invoked their sad fate by some rash or violent acts towards the natives.”43
In the wake of  his failed diplomatic expedition, George Seward called 
a conference to discuss the Korean crisis with the U.S. Ministers to Japan 
and China as well as the Commander of  the Asian Fleet of  the U.S. Navy. 
It was agreed that simple friendly diplomacy would not be sufficient to 
discover the fate of  the General Sherman and negotiate a commercial treaty 
with Korea.  Seward communicated this opinion to his uncle on October 
14, 1868, advising, “that a considerable show of  force would probably 
be needed.”44  The Consul-General remained upbeat about the prospect 
of  opening Korea, recalling how Commodore Perry’s mission to Japan 
had shown “that these eastern peoples are not unalterably wedded to old 
practices and institutions.”45 The Secretary of  State received the report on 
the 7th of  December, and resolved to discuss his nephew’s assessments with 
Secretary of  the Navy Gideon Welles.  However, Andrew Johnson had lost 
the presidential election to Ulysses S. Grant a month before, and both Welles 
and Seward relinquished their posts before any such meeting took place.
The American Invasion of  Korea
On December 27, 1868, Admiral Henry H. Bell filed a report proposing 
dramatic military intervention in Korea.  In his report, he advocated an 
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occupation of  Seoul, an undertaking that would require more than 2,000 
amphibious soldiers as well as regular army reinforcements.  He followed 
Shufeldt’s advice and suggested using Port Hamilton as a launching point 
for the operation.  Finally, he warned against cooperating with colonial 
powers such as Britain or France.  This plan, he explained in a letter 
to Navy Secretary Gideon Welles, “would awe not only Japan and the 
Court of  Peking into profound respect for American views and interests, 
but would disclose to the world who are the masters of  the Pacific.”46
In Washington, Ulysses S. Grant selected Hamilton Fish, a former 
Congressman and Governor of  New York, as Seward’s replacement as 
Secretary of  State.  In a meeting with his successor, Seward suggested 
moderating America’s demands in Korea to an agreement protecting 
the victims of  shipwrecks.  Fish eventually complied with Seward’s 
recommendation on April 20, 1870, forwarding these instructions on to 
the new Minister to China, Frederick Low.  Low was encouraged to seek 
commercial advantages in Korea “should the opportunity seem favorable,”47 
but reminded that “the President principally aims in this mission to secure 
protection and good treatment to such seamen of  the United States as may 
unhappily be wrecked upon those shores.”48  Fish instructed Low to gather 
as much information regarding Korea as possible before setting out.  Finally, 
Fish informed Low that he was to be accompanied by a naval fleet under 
the command of  Admiral John Rogers.  However, he cautioned him to 
“avoid a conflict by force unless it cannot be avoided without dishonor.”49
Evidently, the intelligence Low gathered on Korea did not inspire a 
great degree of  confidence regarding his mission.  By November of  1870, 
Low had grown pessimistic about his prospects.  He reported to Fish on 
November 22, “I am not sanguine of  favorable results; at the same time the 
object aimed at is worthy of  trial.”50  He reiterated his doubts in a dispatch 
written on board the flagship USS Colorado in the Harbor of  Nagasaki on 
May 13, 1871, predicting, “I apprehend that all the cunning and sophistry 
which enter so largely into oriental character will be brought to bear to 
defeat the object of  our visit, and if  that fails it is not unlikely that we may 
be met with a display of  force.”51  Captain McLane Tilton shared Low’s 
pessimism, writing to his wife on June 4, “My impression at this moment 
is, that the people will have no intercourse with us, and our journey will 
be so much love’s labor lost.”52  He proceeds to express his misgivings 
regarding the size of  the American fleet, doubting the outfit’s prospects 
“against a populous country containing 10,000,000 of  [sic] savages!”53
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The Flag of the Commander in Chief of the Korean Forces, Felice 
Beato, June 1871. (The J. Paul Getty Museum, 2007.26.199.46)
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On March 17, 1871, as per his instructions, Low notified the Zongli 
Yamen of  his upcoming excursion to Korea.  China again maintained 
Korea’s diplomatic autonomy.  More importantly, they informed Korea of  
the impending arrival of  another American envoy.  Daewongun resolved 
to resist the westerners, heralding Korea as the final stronghold of  the 
Confucian order.  A frustrated Pak Kyusu responded to China on April 14, 
requesting that China persuade the United States to cancel Low’s mission. 
Pak complained that the General Sherman incident had been resolved and 
that an agreement protecting shipwrecked sailors would be frivolous.  In 
addition, he argued that Korean trade would not prove profitable for 
Americans, citing Korea’s inability to satisfy the demands of  their own 
people.  Korea’s policy of  non-intercourse forbade Pak from sending a 
similar message to the Americans.  As a result, Low and Rodgers assumed 
they had proclaimed their peaceful intentions, and set sail for Korea.
On May 30, Low met with three Korean officials of  uncertain rank 
on board the USS Colorado.  He informed them that he would soon 
send a surveying team up the Han River.  He reiterated his peaceful 
intentions, promising that no harm would come to the Koreans as long 
as the American ships were not threatened.  On May 31, three more 
Korean officials, apparently of  low rank, approached the American outfit, 
giving implicit approval for Low’s explorations.  However, the surveying 
party drew fire as it reached the bend in the Han River at Sondolmok.
On June 2, Low fumed to Fish that the Korean attack was “unprovoked 
and wanton, and without the slightest shadow of  excuse.”54  He declared the 
Koreans “semi-barbarous and hostile,”55  However, a Western newspaper in 
China suggested that the attack was not as gratuitous as Low claimed.  The 
newspaper reported that the Americans had ignored various warning signs, 
including a demonstration by 2,000 soldiers that “seemed intended to induce 
the surveying party to retire.”56  George F. Seward criticized the actions of  
the fleet, writing to Assistant Secretary of  State Bancroft Davis, “I do not 
know why the surveying should have been pushed forward so rapidly.”57
In his June 2 report to the Secretary of  State, Low highlighted the 
American dilemma, ruminating,
The question now is, what is the safe and prudent course to 
pursue in view of  this temporary check, which the Coreans will 
undoubtedly construe into a defeat of  the “barbarians,” but 
which, according to the recognized rules of  civilized warfare, 
was a complete victory on the part of  the naval forces.58
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This was to become the principal American dilemma with regards to the 
Invasion of  Korea.  America had no interest in colonizing or occupying 
Korea.  Indeed, such a course of  action would contravene the very 
principles on which Americans conducted their diplomacy in East Asia. 
However, the United States had maneuvered its way into a quagmire 
wherein anything short of  total victory would be tantamount to utter defeat. 
Low opted to present the Koreans with a ten-day ultimatum, largely as 
a ploy to delay the conflict until the currents of  the Han River turned in 
America’s favor.  If  the Koreans did not apologize for their aggression at 
Sondolmok, they would be subjected to American retaliation.  On June 4, 
Pak Kyusu sent a letter to the American fleet, informing them that Korea 
simply could not understand their intentions, and imploring the Americans 
to understand Korean suspicion.  During the ten-day interval, a curious 
system of  communication developed.  Each night, Koreans affixed 
messages to a pole erected in the mud flats near where the American fleet 
was anchored.  The Americans would collect these messages each morning. 
However, none of  the messages satisfied Low’s demands.  In a last ditch 
attempt to stave off  the attack, the Koreans sent one last letter that was 
carried to the Americans on board a ship waving a white flag.  However, the 
letter did not contain an apology, and Rodgers ordered his fleet to retaliate.
On June 15, Low summarized his expedition in a dispatch to the Secretary 
of  State, maintaining that he had made every effort to resolve the dispute 
amicably, and resorted to violence only as a last resort.  On September 20, 
Fish notified Low that the State Department approved of  his actions, and 
that the American people celebrated his victory as a fitting retribution for the 
destruction of  the General Sherman.  In his annual message to Congress, President 
Ulysses S. Grant took credit for Seward’s initiative, revising history as follows:
Prompted by a desire to put an end to the barbarous 
treatment of  our shipwrecked sailors on the Korean 
coast, I instructed our minister at Peking to endeavor 
to conclude a convention with Korea for securing 
the safety and humane treatment of  such mariners.59
He asserted that the expedition had been “treacherously attacked at a 
disadvantage,” and celebrated Rodgers’ triumph as having “punished the 
criminals” and “vindicated the honor of  the flag.”60  He gracefully tiptoed 
around the fact that the mission had not fulfilled its stated objective, 
concluding that the “the expedition returned, finding it impracticable 
under the circumstances to conclude the desired convention.”61
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Unlike the United States, Korea actually accomplished its goals, provoking 
an American withdrawal without being forced to abandon its isolationist 
policies.  Daewongun concluded that the American declarations of  peaceful 
intent were pretense, rhetorically asking the Chinese why the Americans, 
if  they meant no ill will, felt the need to furnish their expedition with over 
1,000 soldiers.  He presumed that the American expedition was nothing 
more than “a crafty scheme to take advantage of  our negligence, and get 
into the interior.”62  A survey of  the American diplomatic tradition in East 
Asia and the diplomatic correspondence preceding the conflict disproves 
this theory.  As Gordon H. Chang emphasizes, “the Americans sincerely 
believed they had come in peace and harbored no malice toward Korea… 
they were in Korean waters only to raise the barbarous and inferior Koreans 
to a higher standard of  behavior in international relations.”63  America’s 
Invasion of  Korea was not disingenuous.  It was simply a bad idea.
The Shufeldt Treaty and the Opening of  Korea
Korea’s vindication of  her policy of  seclusion was short-lived.  The 
Japanese had already fixed their gaze upon the peninsula, fearing Russian 
expansionism.  Between 1869 and 1872, the Japanese launched four missions 
attempting to establish diplomatic relations with Korea, but Daewongun 
rebuffed them each time.  In 1875, Koreans fired upon a small Japanese ship 
in Korean waters.  The Japanese destroyed four Korean forts in retaliation, 
inflicting heavy casualties.  In December 1875, General Kuroda and Count 
Inoue arrived in Korea to negotiate a Treaty of  Amity and Commerce.  Like 
George F. Seward in 1868 and Frederick Low in 1871, Inoue and Kuroda 
had been instructed to follow the methods Commodore Perry had used 
in Japan.  This time, these tactics prevailed.  Japan and Korea signed the 
Treaty of  Kianghwa on February 27, 1876, establishing diplomatic relations, 
opening three Korean ports, securing extraterritorial rights for Japanese 
nationals, and detaching Korea from Chinese suzerainty.  
On October 29, 1878, Navy Secretary Richard W. Thompson authorized 
Admiral Robert W. Shufeldt to open Korea for America.  The initiative for 
this expedition came almost entirely from Shufeldt himself.  The Admiral 
blamed Western behavior for the failure of  1871, and resolved to mollify 
King Gojong throughout the proceedings.  At first, Shufeldt attempted 
to exploit the newly forged Japano-Korean intimacy, but Japan suspected 
ulterior motives and impeded his efforts.  Equally curious of  Shufeldt’s 
intentions was Li Hungchang, the Chinese official for Korean affairs, who 
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invited Shufeldt to Tianjin.  Li offered to use his authority to persuade 
Korea to negotiate, evidently hoping to exploit the negotiations to offset 
Japan’s recognition of  Korean independence.  Li enlisted Chinese officials 
to transport the treaty to Korea on board a Chinese ship, despite the fact 
that Shufeldt refused to insert a clause recognizing Korean subservience to 
China.  Shin Chen and Chin Hong-Chi of  the Korean Royal Cabinet signed 
the Shufeldt Treaty on behalf  of  King Gojong on May 22, 1882.  Japanese 
and American success in Korea inspired a great contest for Korea, with Great 
Britain and Germany securing treaties with the Hermit Kingdom in 1883, 
followed by Italy in 1884 and France in 1886.
   * * *
Throughout the middle decades of  the 19th century, American diplomats 
pursued consistent goals in the Far East: striving to earn most-favored-nation 
status and protecting the lives and property of  American citizens while 
preserving the sovereign integrity of  Asian nations.  Every plenipotentiary 
who crossed the Pacific to negotiate the opening of  Asian commerce—Caleb 
Cushing, Matthew C. Perry, Townshend Harris, George F. Seward, Frederick 
Low, and Robert W. Shufeldt—carried with him the same American principles. 
The differences between these missions, therefore, were not ideological. 
They were strategic.  For example, Perry and Low’s missions were necessarily 
more threatening than Cushing’s, as Japan and Korea clung to traditional 
policies of  seclusion in a way that China did not.  Furthermore, Japan had a 
reputation for brutal treatment of  shipwrecked American sailors and Korea 
had set fire to the General Sherman, which was still presumed to have been a 
legitimate commercial venture at the time of  the Low expedition.  
Low’s expedition, the 1871 American Invasion of  Korea, mimicked 
Commodore Perry’s 1853 mission to Japan both ideologically and strategically. 
However, whereas Perry’s action reflected an accurate assessment of  strategic 
realities, Low’s action “was as much of  a failure as most imitations are.”64  The 
Invasion of  Korea was an unwinnable war.  Considering the spike in Korean 
morale after the prior French Invasion, a diplomatic mission backed by a small 
naval fleet was not sufficient to end Korea’s seclusion.  Even if  force was the 
best option, then America would have had to utterly decimate Korea, perhaps 
even occupy the peninsula, before Daewongun would have submitted to the 
treason of  international commerce.  A mere five American warships could 
never have sufficed.  America’s commitment to anti-colonialism rendered this 
solution untenable.  In the greater context of  American diplomacy in the 
Far East, the American Invasion of  Korea stands out not as an imperialistic 
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anomaly or a moral atrocity.  It distinguishes itself  as a woeful miscalculation 
and a sheer strategic nightmare.
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